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Mary Noonan, Clerk
yfjMy/C/^
Utah Court of Appeals
\/ ^ * ^ ^ - ~
23 0 South 500 East, #400
Y SJn^Court
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re: GNS Partnership v. Fullmer
Case No. 920763-CA
Dear Ms. Noonan:
This letter is sent pursuant to Rule 28 (j), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure. In preparing for oral argument for the abovereferenced case, which is set for oral argument on Monday, March
28, 1994, I discovered the following pertinent and significant
authorities which I understand were not available in reporters when
briefs were filed:
United Fire & Casualty Co. v. Bruaqeman, 505 N.W.2d
87 (Minn. App. 1993);
Community Credit Union v. Homelvig, 487 N.W.2d 602
(N.D. 1992); and
Dix Mutual Insurance v. La Framboise, 597 N.E.2d 622
(111. 1992).
These cases pertain to Point I beginning at page 9 in the
Brief of Brad Fullmer.
The cases are significant because they
address one of the issues on appeal, whether a right of subrogation
exists in favor of the landlord's insurer against a tenant.
Very truly yours,
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
KWM/da
cc: Stuart Schultz
Strong & Hanni
600 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Keith W. Meade
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UNITED FIRE & CASUALTY
COMPANY, Appellant,
v.
Jerry BRUGGEMAN and Carla Bruggeman, d/b/a Junction Gifts and Craft
Supply, Respondents,
and
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY
CO., Plaintiff,
v.
Jerry BRUGGEMAN and Carla Bruggeman, d/b/a Junction Gifts and Craft
Supply, Respondents.
No. C3-93-333.
Court of Appeals of Minnesota.
Aug. 31, 1993.
Review Denied Oct. 19, 1993.
Landlords fire insurer brought subrogation action against negligent tenants. The
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District Court, Sherburne County, RobeH B.
Danforth, J., entered judgment for tenants,
and landlord appealed. The Court of Appeals, Forsberg, J., held that tenants were
coinsureds, for subrogation purposes.
Affirmed.

1. Insurance 0606(2.1)
Negligent tenants were coinsureds under landlord's fire policy, and, thus, were not
amenable to subrogation suit.
2. Insurance 0606(2.1)
Tenants are coinsureds with landlord,
for subrogation purposes; tenants and landlord have insurable interest in leased premises, and since premium reflects increased risk
of rental use and premium may be passed on
to tenant in form of rent, this is most efficient wray to allocate insurance costs.
Syllabus by the Court
Tenants are co-insureds under their
landlord's fire insurance policy for purposes
of subrogation actions.

Gordon H. Hansmeier, Michael C. Rajkowski, Donohue Rajkowski Ltd., St. Cloud, for
appellant.
Lee F. Haskell, Thomas F. Ascher, Cosgrove, Flynn, Gaskins & O'Connor, Minneapolis, for respondents.
Considered and decided by FORSBERG,
P.J. and HUSPENI and SCHULTZ,* J J.
OPINION
FORSBERG, Judge.
[1] A landlord's insurer brought a subrogation action against negligent tenants who
caused fire damages. The trial court determined the tenants were co-insureds under
the policy and therefore not amenable to suit.
We affirm.
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as
judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by ap-

FACTS
Respondents Jerry and Carla Bruggemal
rented space from the Jedneak Brother]
Properties in July 1990. There was no writ
ten lease or contract between the parties
and no independent arrangement for provj
sion of insurance coverage was discussed
On August 6, 1990, a fire destroyed the prog
erty. The Jedneak Brothers were paid $81J
275 by their insurer, appellant United Fire J
Casualty Company (United).
|
United claimed the fire was negligently
caused by the Bruggemans, and commence!
this subrogation action. Trial was bifurcat*
ed, with a jury determining negligence and
damages, and the court determining the legal
issue of whether a subrogation action may be
maintained. The jury found the Brugge:
mans were negligent and assigned damage?
in the amount of $37,775. Despite these
factual findings prerequisite to a subrogatio|
action, the trial court denied recovery bj
finding the Bruggemans were co-insured!
under the fire policy. United's motion for |
new trial was denied, and judgment was er^
tered. United appeals, claiming the trial
court erred in finding the Bruggemans were
co-insureds.
1
ISSUE
j
Did the trial court err in finding the ter£
ants co-insureds under their landlord's fir^
insurance policy, and therefore not amenable
to a subrogation action?
«
i
ANALYSIS
)
[2] United claims the trial court erred in
determining the Bruggemans were co-insureds under its policy covering the Jedneai
Brothers' property. This is a case of firsi
impression in Minnesota, but the issue ha|
been considered extensively by a number d
other jurisdictions, where there is a cleai
split in the holdings. We believe the greatel
wisdom is in the majority position.
t
The first and leading case to state tfe
majority position is Sutton v. Jondahl, 533
P.2d 478 (Okla.App.1975). As in this case, 4

i
pomtment pursuant to Minn Const art. VI, § Ify
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jury found a tenant had negligently caused a
fire. Likewise, as here, there was no expressed agreement between landlord and
tenant covering provision of fire insurance.
The Sutton court determined subrogation
was not available to the landlord's insurer.
Id. at 482.
The Sutton court recognized the landlord
and the tenant were co-insureds because
each had an insurable interest in the property—the landlord a fee interest and the tenant
a possessory interest. In Sutton, as here,
the party with the fee interest purchased fire
insurance,
[alnd as a matter of sound business practice the premium paid had to be considered
in establishing the rent rate on the rental
unit. Such premium was chargeable
against the rent as an overhead or operating expense. And of course it follows then
that the tenant actually paid the premium
as part of the monthly rental.
Id. This sharing of proprietary interests and
the expenses associated with protecting them
gives rise to the co-insured relationship.
We believe this is the most efficient way to
allocate insurance costs. This is especially
true when considering the reality of today's
multi-unit rental market. If, as United contends, each tenant is responsible for all damages arising from its negligence in causing a
tire and if each tenant was therefore responsible for its own fire insurance, the same
property would be insured many times over.
While this may provide insurance companies
a welcome windfall, it would be contrary to
economic logic and common sense.
The minority position on the subject is well
illustrated by the case of Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 N.W.2d 87 (Ia.1992). The Neubauer court took a close look at the authority
on this question and allowed the subrogation
action because " it satisfies equitable concerns by placing the burden of the loss where
it ought to be—on the negligent party.' " Id.
at 89 (quoting Fire Ins. Exch. v. Geekie, 179
IU.App.3d 679, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 617, 534
N.E.2d 1061, 1062 (1989)).
This minority position disregards the majority position's reasoning that a co-insured
relationship is established because the tenant

indirectly pays the insurance premiums.
When payment of rent is understood to include insurance premiums, as we believe it
does, the minority position fails because insurance is purchased to hold the insured
harmless from its negligence. The parties'
status as co-insureds renders nugatory the
issue of the relative negligence of the separate interest holders.
Also, we are not convinced by the minority
position's concern that establishing the coinsured relationship for purposes of subrogation interferes with an insurer's ability to
limit its risk.
The insurer has a right to choose whom it
will insure and it did not choose to insure
the lessees, and under [Sutton ] the lessee
could have sued the insurer for loss due to
damage to the realty, e.g. loss of use if
policy provides such coverage. Cases following Sutton, however, have at least impliedly restricted the co-insurance relationship to one limited solely to the purpose of
prohibiting subrogation.
Id., 485 N.W.2d at 89 (quoting 6A J. Appleman, Irisurance Law and Practice § 4055, at
94 n. 86.01 (1991 Supp.)).
The insurer knows the risk it is undertaking when insuring a rental property. It insures the building for the use for which it is
intended. WTiile it may not have control
over who the individual tenants are, it can
increase its premiums to reflect increased
risks presented by changing tenant use.
Likewise, it can require the landlord to undertake any number of safety and structural
precautions. We believe the landlord is the
party in the best position to assume such
responsibilities, and we reject the minority
position on this issue.
Finally, we find no problem with limiting
the co-insured relationship to the subrogation
context. Landlord and tenant have separate
insurable risks for loss of use in the event of
a fire. The landlord's risk is directly related
to the insured structure, that is, loss of rents.
The tenant's loss of use involves the activity
carried on within the structure. The tenant's
loss arises from the use, not the structure.
The shared insurable interests between landlord and tenant are limited to the structure,
which is the subject of the fire policy. Risks

90
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such as loss of use are therefore properly
dealt mth in separate insurance contracts.
United also claims several evidentiary errors led to an insufficient award of damages.
Since we affirm the trial court's dismissal of
the subrogation action, we need not reach
this issue.
DECISION
The Bruggemans were co-insureds under
the Jedneak Brothers' fire insurance policy,
and therefore are not subject to subrogation
by United. The judgment of the tnal court
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION OF NEW
ROCKFORD, NORTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Lynn HOMELVIG and Cindy Homeivig,
husband and wife, Defendants and
Appellees.
Civ. No. 920001.
Supreme Court of North Dakota.
July 28, 1992.

Landlord's insurer, after paying landlord damages under fire policy for fire
damage to leased house, brought subroga-,
tion action against tenants in landlord's
name, alleging that tenants negligently
caused fire. The District Court, Eddy
County, Gordon 0. Hoberg, J., entered
summary judgment in favor of tenants, and
appeal was taken. The Supreme Court,
Erickstad, C.J., held that absent express
agreement to the contrary, tenant is implied coinsured under landlord's fire insurance policy, and insurer may not seek subrogation against tenant.
Affirmed.

1. Judgment <&^178
Purpose of summary judgment is to
promote prompt and expeditious disposition
of legal conflict on its merits, without trial,
if no material dispute of fact exists or if
only question of law is involved.
further similar acts of misconduct that cause
injury or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.
6.

NDPRLDD 4.5 addresses reinstatement of a
lawyer after a short suspension:
B. Short Suspension. A lawyer suspended
for six months or less may resume practice at
the end of the period of suspension by filing
with the court and serving upon counsel an

COMMUNITY CREDIT UNION v. HOMELVIG
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2. Insurance <s=580(4), 606(1.1)
Absent express agreement to the contrary, tenant is implied coinsured under
landlord's fire insurance policy, and insurer
may not seek subrogation against tenant.
Michael J. Morley, of Morley & Morley,
Ltd., Grand Forks, for plaintiff and appellant. Argued by Robert M. Light.
William P. Harrie (argued), of Nilles,
Hansen & Davies, Ltd., Fargo, for defendants and appellees.
ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice.
The Community Credit Union of New
Rockford appeals from a district court summary judgment dismissing its action
against Lynn and Cindy Homelvig. We
affirm.
The Homelvigs leased a house from the
Credit Union on a month-to-month basis
with an option to purchase. The agreement between the parties was oral; no
written lease agreement was ever signed
by the parties. The Credit Union insured
the house with a policy issued by Cumis
Insurance Society. The Homelvigs obtained renters insurance, including liability
coverage, from North Star Mutual Insurance Company.
^ On August 22, 1990, a fire destroyed the
kitchen and caused smoke damage to the
remainder of the house. Cumis paid $38,307 to the Credit Union for the damages.
Cumis then brought this subrogation action in the Credit Union's name, alleging
that the Homelvigs negligently caused the
fire. The Homelvigs moved for summary
judgment, asserting that they were co-insureds under the Cumis policy and that
subrogation was barred as a matter of law.
The district court concluded that the Homelvigs were co-insureds under the Cumis
policy and granted summary judgment.
Cumis, through the Credit Union, appealed.
[1] The purpose of summary judgment
is to promote the prompt and expeditious
disposition of a legal conflict on its merits,
without trial, if no material dispute of fact
pykts or if onlv a question of law is in-

volved. E.g., Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., Alb N.W.2d 136, 137
(N.D. 1991); United Electric Service &
Supply, Inc. v. Powers, 464 N.W.2d 818,
819 (N.D.1991). The dispositive issue in
this case is a question of law: whether a
tenant is an implied co-insured on a landlord's fire insurance policy as a matter of
law, absent an express agreement to the
contrary. If the tenant is a co-insured
under the policy, subrogation is unavailable. See Agra-By-Products, Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 142, 145 (N.D.1984);
6A Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice
§ 4055 (1972); 16 Couch, Insurance Law
§ 61:137 (2d ed. 1983).
The great majority of courts which have
addressed this issue have held that, absent
an express agreement to the contrary, a
tenant is an implied co-insured under the
landlord's fire policy and subrogation is
barred. See, e.g., Tate v. Trialco Scrap,
Inc., 745 F.Supp. 458 (M.D.Tenn.1989);
Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska
Communications, Inc., 623 P.2d 1216
(Alaska 1981); Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Auto Spring Supply Co., 59
Cal.App.3d 860, 131 Cal.Rptr. 211 (1976);
Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Weisgerber, 115
Idaho 428, 767 P.2d 271 (1989); New
Hampshire Insurance Group v. Labombard, 155 Mich.App. 369, 399 N.W.2d 527
(1986); Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 101
Nev. 429, 705 P.2d 659 (1985); Sutton v.
Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okl.Ct.App.1975);
Fashion Place Investment, Ltd. v. Salt
Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah Ct.App.
1989); Cascade Trailer Court v. Beeson,
50 Wash.App. 678, 749 P.2d 761 (1988).
As noted by one leading commentator:
"The modem trend of authority holds
that the lessor's insurer cannot obtain
subrogation against the lessee, in the
absence of an express agreement or
lease provision establishing the lessee's
liability, because the lessee is considered
a co-insured of the lessor for the purpose
of preventing subrogation; the parties
are co-insureds because of the reasonable
expectations they derive from their privity under the lease, their insurable interests in the property, and the commercial
realities under which lessors insure
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leased premises and pass on the premium
cost in rent and under which insurers
make reimbursement for fires negligently caused by their insureds' negligence."
6A Appleman, supra, § 4055, 1991 Supp. at
79. Professor Keeton also advocates the
majority rule:
"The possibility that a lessor's insurer
may proceed against a lessee almost certainly is not within the expectations of
most landlords and tenants unless they
have been forewarned by expert counseling. When lease provisions are either
silent or ambiguous in this regard—and
especially when a lessor's insurance policy is also silent or ambiguous—courts
should adopt a rule against allowing the
lessor's insurer to proceed against the
tenant."
Keeton & Widiss, Insurance Law § 4.4(b)
at 340-341 (1988) (footnote omitted).
The seminal case setting forth the majority rule is Sutton v. Jondahl, supra, in
which the tenant's son had caused a fire
damaging the insured premises. Concluding that the landlord's insurer could not
seek subrogation against the tenant, the
court reasoned:
''Under the facts and circumstances in
this record the subrogation should not be
available to the insurance carrier because
the law considers the tenant as a coinsured of the landlord absent an express
agreement between them to the contrary,
comparable to the permissive-user feature of automobile insurance. This principle is derived from a recognition of a
relational reality, namely, that both landlord and tenant have an insurable interest in the rented premises—the former
owns the fee and the latter has a possessory interest. Here the landlords (Suttons) purchased the fire insurance from
Central Mutual Insurance Company to
protect such interests in the property
against loss from fire. This is not uncommon. And as a matter of sound business practice the premium paid had to be
considered in establishing the rent rate
on the rental unit. Such premium was
chargeable against the rent as an overhead or operating expense. And of

course it follows then that the tenant
actually paid the premium as part of the
monthly rental.
'The landlords of course could have
held out for an agreement that the tenant would furnish fire insurance on the
premises. But they did not. They elected to themselves purchase the coverage.
To suggest the fire insurance does not
extend to the insurable interest of an
occupying tenant is to ignore the realities
of urban apartment and single-family
dwelling renting. Prospective tenants
ordinarily rely upon the owner of the
dwelling to provide fire protection for the
realty (as distinguished from personal
property) absent an express agreement
otherwise
"Basic equity and fundamental justice
upon which the equitable doctrine of subrogation is established requires that
when fire insurance is provided for a
dwelling it protects the insurable interests of all joint owners including the
possessory interests of a tenant absent
an express agreement by the latter to
the contrary. The company affording
such coverage should not be allowed to
shift a fire loss to an occupying tenant
even if the latter negligently caused
it . . . For to conclude otherwise is to
shift the insurable risk assumed by the
insurance company from it to the tenant—a party occupying a substantially
different position from that of a firecausing third party not in privity with
the insured landlord."
Sutton v. Jondahl, supra, 532 P.2d at 482.
Other courts V^ve ex-p^ded the Suttou
rationale, addressing various public policies
which support the rule. For example, in
Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, supra, 705
P.2d at 661, the Supreme Court of Nevada
stated:
"It is not uncommon for the lessor to
provide fire insurance on the leased prop;
erty. As a matter of sound business
practice, the premium to be paid had to
be considered in establishing the rental
rate. Also, such premiums would be
chargeable against the rent as an overhead or operating expense. Accordingly,
the tenant actually paid the premium as
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part of the monthly rental. Sutton, supra, 532 P.2d at 482. Courts therefore
consider it to be an undue hardship to
require a tenant to insure against his
own negligence, when he is paying,
through his rent, for the fire insurance
which covers the premises
"Moreover, insurance companies expect to pay their insureds for negligently
caused fires and adjust their rates accordingly. In this context, an insurer
should not be allowed to treat a tenant,
who is in privity with the insured landlord, as a negligent third party when it
could not collect against its own insured
had the insured negligently caused the
fire."
See also New Hampshire
Insurance
Group v. Labombard, supra, 399 N.W.2d
at 531.
The court in Tate v. Trtalco Scrap, Inc.,
supra, 745 F.Supp. at 473, also emphasized
that it is the tenant who ultimately bears
the cost of the landlord's insurance premiums:
"The realities of who ultimately pays
for the insurance also support adoption
of this rule. Despite the fact that the
lessor may actually send the premium
check to the insurance company, the lessee ultimately pays for insurance
through his rent checks, because the lessor takes his own costs into account
when setting rent. If the lessee is ultimately the source of the insurance payment, simple equity would suggest that
he be able to benefit from that payment
unless he has clearly bargained away
that benefit."
Other policy arguments in favor of the
majority rule include preventing windfalls
to insurers and preventing multiple policies
and overlapping coverage. See, e.g., Tate
v. Trtalco Scrap, Inc., supra, 745 F.Supp.
at 473; Safeco Insurance Cos. v. Weisgerber, supra, 767 P.2d at 274.
[2] The cases adopting the majority
rule are well-reasoned and highly persuasive. We hold that, absent an express
agreement to the contrary, a tenant is an
implied co-insured under the landlord's in-

surance policy and the insurer may not
seek subrogation against the tenant.
The district court did not err in holding
that the Homelvigs were implied co-insureds under the Cumis policy. Accordingly, summary judgment was appropriate.
The judgment is affirmed.
VANDE WALLE, LEVINE, MESCHKE
and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.
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tenant could not be held liable for negligently caused fire damage to leased premises solely on basis that lease did not contain a provision expressly relieving tenant
of such liability; (2) construing lease as a
whole, parties intended that tenant was not
to be liable for any fire damage to premises
and that landlord would look solely to insurance as compensation for any fire damage to the premises; and (3) by payment of
rent, tenant gained status of coinsured under policy, precluding subrogation action
against tenant by insurer.
Appellate Court
Court affirmed.

reversed;

Circuit

Freeman, J., concurred with opinion.
Heiple, J., dissented with opinion.

1. Pretrial Procedure ^679
When legal sufficiency of a complaint
is challenged by a motion to dismiss, all
well-pleaded facts in the complaint are taken as true.
149 I11.2d 314
173 Ill.Dec. 648

DIX MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
as Subrogee of Roy Mitchell Estate,
Appellee,
v.
Terrence LaFRAMBOISE, Appellant.
No. 72037.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
July 30, 1992.
Insurer filed subrogation action
against tenant to recover amount it paid to
landlord for fire loss allegedly caused by
tenant's negligence. The Circuit Court,
Vermilion County, John P. O'Rourke, J.,
dismissed complaint, and insurer appealed.
The Appellate Court, 213 Ill.App.3d 292,
157 Ill.Dec.140, 571 N.E.2d 1159, reversed
and remanded. Tenant petitioned for leave
to appeal which was allowed. The Supreme Court, Bilandic, J., held that: (1)

2. Appeal and Error <3=*863, 919
On review of dismissal for failure to
state a cause of action, Supreme Court
must determine whether well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, when interpreted
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, are
sufficient to set forth a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted.
3. Subrogation <3=»1
"Subrogation" is a {method whereby
one who has involuntarily paid a debt or
claim of another succeeds to the rights of
the other with respect to the claim or debt
so paid.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.

4. Subrogation <s=»l
Right of subrogation is an equitable
right and remedy which rests on principle
that substantial justice should be attained
by placing ultimate responsibility for a loss
upon the one against whom in good conscience it ought to fall.

DIX MUT. INS. CO. v. LapRAMBOISE

111. 6 2 3

Cite M 397 N.R2d 622 (III 1992)

5. Subrogation <&»1
Subrogation is allowed to prevent injustice and unjust enrichment but will not
be allowed where it would be inequitable to
do so.

12. Insurance <fc=>606(l)
Insurer may not subrogate against its
own insured or any person or entity that
has a status of a coinsured under the policy.

6. Subrogation <s=>l
There is no general rule to determine
whether right of subrogation exists since
right depends upon equities of each particular case.

13. Insurance <^606(1.1)
Under provisions of lease as a whole,
reasonable expectations of the parties, and
principles of equity and good conscience,
fire insurer under policy issued to landlord
could not maintain subrogation action
against tenant for fire loss due to tenant's
negligence; by payment of rent, tenant
contributed to payment of insurance premium, thereby gaining status of coinsured
under policy; moreover, landlord intended
that policy would cover any fire damage to
premises no matter who caused it, and to
conclude otherwise would have defeated
reasonable expectations of the parties.

7. Subrogation <3=>32
One who asserts a right of subrogation
must step into the shoes of, or be substituted for, the one whose claim or debt he has
paid and can only enforce those rights
which the latter could enforce.
8. Landlord and Tenant <S=>55(1)
Although a tenant is generally liable
for fire damage caused to leased premises
by his negligence, if the parties intended to
exculpate the tenant from negligently
caused fire damage, their intent witi be
enforced.
9. Landlord and Tenant <s=>37
Lease between landlord and tenant
must be interpreted as a whole so as to
give effect to intent of the parties.
10. Landlord and Tenant @=*55(1)
Tenant could not be held liable for
negligently caused fire damage to leased
premises solely on basis that lease did not
contain a provision expressly relieving tenant of such liability.
11. Landlord and Tenant <&=»55(1)
Construing lease as a whole, parties
intended that tenant was not to be liable
for any fire damage to premises and that
landlord would look solely to insurance as
compensation for any fire damage to premises; parties considered possibility of fire
and expressly provided that landlord would
not be responsible for fire damage to tenant's personal property, indicating that parties intended for each to be responsible for
his own property; conclusion was supported by landlord's conduct in taking out
fire policy to cover leased premises.

John A. Beyer and Steven D. Ziegler,
Satter, Beyer & Spires, Pontiac, for appellant.
Monica E. Rackauskas, Mark E. Condon
and Peter W. Schoonmaker, Condon &
Cook, Chicago, for appellee.
Justice BILANDIC delivered the opinion
of the court:
Dix Mutual Insurance Company (insurance company) paid its insured (landlord)
$40,579 for a fire loss on certain real property. The insurance company, by way of
subrogation, seeks to recover the $40,579
from Terrence LaFramboise (tenant) because he allegedl^caused the fire loss due
to his negligence. The trial court dismissed the insurance company's firstamended complaint for failure to state a
cause of action. The trial court found that
the parties did not intend for the tenant to
be liable for fire damage to the real property and that the tenant was a co-insured
under the insurance company's insurance
policy. The appellate court reversed, reinstated the first-amended complaint and remanded the cause for further proceedings,
213 Ill.App.3d 292, 157 Ill.Dec. 140, 571
N.E.2d 1159. We allowed the tenant's petition for leave to appeal, 141 I11.2d 538, 162
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Ill.Dec. 485, 580 N.E.2d 111. (134 I11.2d R.
315.) We reverse.
The unique facts of this case compel us
to include the entire lease, which, in words
and figures, is as follows:
"LEASE AGREEMENT
This Lease is made between Terry
LaFramboise, tenant and acting landlord,
J.S. Ludwig.
The house is leased beginning September 15, 1986 through September 15, 1987
for $325.00 per month. This amount is
payable on the 15 [sic] of the month.
TERMS:
(A) $325.00 deposit has been made and
will be considered the last month's rent
of the year.
(B) The Tenant is to furnish their [sic ]
own utilities.
(C) The Tenant is to mow and keep the
yard and area around the house neat at
all times and the farm buildings.
(D) The Tenant will not xxxxxxxxxxxx
[sic] in walls, paint, or make any additions to the home that are permanent
without approval of the Landlord.
(E) The Tenant will assume their [sic ]
own risk for their [sic ] personal property
and Landlord, J.S. Ludwig, will not be
responsible for fire, wind, or water damage.
DESCRIPTION:
The house is located on the Mitchell
Farm in Vermilion County, Pilot township.
TENANT:
LANDLORD:
s/
Terry LaFramboise s/
JJ^ Ludwig
Date: 9-16-86
Date: 9-15-86"
During the term of the lease, the landlord
maintained fire insurance coverage on the
real property from the insurance company.
During the one-year term, the tenant,
with the landlord's approval, attempted to
strip the paint from the exterior of the
property with a power stripper, which removes paint by heat application. During
this process, the house was damaged by
fire. The landlord filed a claim with the
insurance company and was paid $40,579
for the loss. The insurance company then
brought this subrogation action against the

tenant to recover the amount it paid to the
landlord for the fire loss. In its complaint,
the insurance company alleged that the tenant was negligent in his use of the power
stripper. The issue before this court is
whether the insurance company's firstamended complaint states a cause of action
in subrogation.
[1,2] When the legal sufficiency of a
complaint is challenged by a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint
are to be taken as true. (Burdinie v.
Village of Glendale Heights (1990), 139
I11.2d 501, 505, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d
654.) On review, we must determine
whether the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint, when interpreted in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to set forth a cause of action upon
which relief may be granted. Burdinie,
139 I11.2d 501, 152 Ill.Dec. 121, 565 N.E.2d
654.
[3-6] The doctrine of subrogation is a
creature of chancery. It is a method
whereby one who has involuntarily paid a
debt or claim of another succeeds to the
rights of the other with respect to the claim
or debt so paid. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation § 2 (1958).) The right of subrogation
is an equitable right and remedy which
rests on the principle that substantial justice should be attained by placing ultimate
responsibility for the loss upon the one
against whom in good conscience it ought
to fall. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation § 2
(1958).) Subrogation is allowed to prevent
injustice and unjust enrichmenttbut will not
be allowed where it would be inequitable to
do so. (34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation § 6
(1958).) There is no general rule which can
be laid down to determine whether a right
of subrogation exists since this right depends upon the equities of each particular
case. See 34 Ill.L. & Prac. Subrogation
§ 6 (1958).
[7] One who asserts a right of subrogation must step into the shoes of, or be
substituted for, the one whose claim or
debt he has paid and can only enforce those
rights which the latter could enforce.
(Continental Casualty Co, v. Polk Broth-

DIX MUT. INS. CO. v. LaFRAMBOISE
Cite as 597 N.E.2d 622 (111. 1992)

ers, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 395, 397, 75
Ill.Dec. 712, 457 N.E.2d 1271.) Consequently, in the case at bar, the insurance
company may assert a right of subrogation
against the tenant for the fire damage if:
(1) the landlord could maintain a cause of
action against the tenant and (2) it would
be equitable to allow the insurance company to enforce a right of subrogation
against the tenant.
[8,9] With these principles in mind, we
turn to the case at bar. Although a tenant
is generally liable for fire damage caused
to the leased premises by his negligence, if
the parties intended to exculpate the tenant
from negligently caused fire damage, their
intent will be enforced. {One Hundred
South Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food
Service, Inc. (1975), 60 I11.2d 312, 326
N.E.2d 400; Stein v. Yarnall-Todd Chevrolet, Inc. (1968), 41 I11.2d 32, 241 N.E.2d
439; Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co.
(1955), 7 I11.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100.) The
lease between the landlord and the tenant
must be interpreted as a whole so as to
give effect to the intent of the parties.
Stein, 41 I11.2d at 35, 241 N.E.2d 439.
[10] In the instant case, the insurance
company contends that the tenant is liable
for negligently caused fire damage because
the lease does not contain a provision expressly relieving the tenant of this liability.
This argument, however, is without merit.
In Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 396, 131
N.E.2d 100, this court stated:
"[B]ecause the contingency was not covered by express language, it does not
follow that the instrument may not,
when all of its provisions are considered, show that the parties themselves intended that the lessee should
not be liable. That determination is to
be made upon a consideration of the instrument as a whole." (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, to ascertain the intent of the
parties, we must consider the lease "as a
whole."
[11] Although the appellate court properly determined that Cerny-Pickas controls the instant case, it nevertheless failed
to actually construe the lease "as a whole."

111. 625

Instead, the appellate court concluded that
the absence of a "yield-back" provision revealed the parties' intent to place responsibility for negligently caused fire damage
on the tenant. The appellate court determined that the tenant could only be relieved of this responsibility by an express
provision in the lease. This, however, is
not the law in Illinois. In Illinois, courts
must look to the lease "as a whole" and the
spirit of the agreement between the parties
rather than search for an express provision
in the lease. (See One Hundred South
Wacker Drive, Inc. v. Szabo Food Service,
Inc. (1975), 60 I11.2d 312, 314, 326 N.E.2d
400; Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 396, 131
N.E.2d 100.) In the instant case, even the
most cursory examination of the lease "as
a whole" leads us to the obvious conclusion
that neither the landlord nor the tenant
was a sophisticated real estate mogul. It
is hardly surprising to us that this particular lease does not contain a "yield-back"
clause, as it is quite likely that the parties
involved did not even know what a "yieldback" clause is.
The lease "as a whole" indicated that the
tenant wanted shelter for one year for
which he promised to pay a modest rent,
furnish his own utilities, perform certain
services on the farm, and assume the risk
for his own personal property. The landlord agreed. Although one may be critical
of the grammar, punctuation or even the
style of the lease, it is difficult to find fault
with the spirit of the document. In drafting this document, the landlord expressly
placed minor duties on the tenant. "As a
whole," the lease does not reflect any intent that, during the course of the one-year
term, the tenant would be responsible for
any fire damage to the realty and be required to pay an additional $40,579»totothe
the I
landlord. Such a proposition wouldI proba- J
bly be beyond the wildest dreams of the I
parties.

j]

The only paragraph which purportedly
addresses the risks borne by either party is
paragraph (E) which reads:
"(E) The Tenant will assume their
[sic] own risk for their [sic] personal
property and Landlord, J.S. Ludwig, will
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not be responsible for fire, wind or water
damage.''
The insurance company contends that the
last clause in this paragraph reveals the
parties' intent to place responsibility for
fire damage to the real property on the
tenant. This argument persuaded the appellate court. However, the appellate
court improperly read the last clause in
isolation from the beginning part of the
sentence. When read as one complete sentence, it is obvious to us that the parties
intended to expressly place responsibility
for his own personal property on the tenant
and to exempt the landlord from liability
for damage to the tenant's personal property. See, e.g., Tondre v. Pontiac School
District No. 105 (1975), 33 Ill.App.3d 838,
843, 342 N.E.2d 290 (qualifying phrase is
confined to the last antecedent).
We find it significant that the parties,
who obviously considered the possibility of
fire, expressly provided for the tenant's
personal property but failed to do so with
respect to the leased premises. This fact
indicates to us that the parties intended for
each to be responsible for his own property. This conclusion is supported by the
landlord's conduct in taking out a fire insurance policy to cover the leased premises.
As this court has noted before:
" Tire insurers expect to pay fire losses
for negligent fires and their rates are
calculated upon that basis; indeed, we
may well assume that a great majority of
fires are caused by someone's negligence
in a greater or lesser degree.' [Citations.]" Stein, 41 I11.2d at 38, 241
N.E.2d 439.
Under the insurance company's argument:
"it would be necessary for both parties
to the lease to carry fire insurance if
they are to be protected. The lessee
would have to insure against fires due to
his negligence, and the lessor against
fires due to other causes. * * * The
parties contemplated that the risk of loss
by fire should be insured against and we
see no reason to suppose that they did
not contemplate the customary insurance
policy which covers both accidental and

negligent fires." (Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d
at 398, 131 N.E.2d 100.)
Therefore, we conclude that the parties intended that the tenant was not to be liable
for any fire damage to the premises and
that the landlord would look solely to the
insurance as compensation for any fire
damage to the premises.
In Cerny-Pickas, this court also noted:
" The ancient law has been acquiesced
in, and consciously or unconsciously, the
cost of insurance to the landlord, or the
value of the risk enters into the amount
of rent.' * * * 'They necessarily consciously figured on the rentals to be paid
by the tenant as the source of the fire
insurance premiums and intended that
the cost of insurance was to come from
the tenants. In practical effect the tenant paid the cost of the fire insurance.' "
Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131 N.E.2d
100.
[12,13] It is well settled that an insurer
may not subrogate against its own insured
or any person or entity who has the status
of a co-insured under the insurance policy.
{Reich v. Tharp (1987), 167 Ill.App.3d 496,
501, 118 IlLDec. 248, 521 N.E.2d 530; 16
Couch on Insurance § 61:137, at 197 (rev.
1983).) Under the particular facts of this
case, the tenant, by payment of rent, has
contributed to the payment of the insurance premium, thereby gaining the status
of co-insured under the insurance policy.
Both the landlord and tenant intended that
the policy would cover any fire damage to
the premises no matter who caused it, and
to conclude otherwise would defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties.
We therefore conclude that, under the
provisions of the lease as a whole, the
reasonable expectations of the parties, and
the principles of equity and good conscience, the insurance company cannot
maintain a subrogation action against the
tenant under the facts of this case.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse
the appellate court and affirm the trial
court's dismissal of the insurance company's first-amended complaint.
Appellate court reversed; circuit court
affirmed.
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Justice FREEMAN, concurring:
I concur with that portion of the majority
opinion which holds that the parties intended that the tenant be exonerated from liability for any fire damage to the premises
and that the landlord might look solely to
the insurance as compensation for any fire
damage to the premises. I write only to
express my disagreement with the majority
holding that under these facts the tenant
attained "the status of a co-insured under
the insurance policy" by the payment of
rent. 149 I11.2d at 323, 173 Ill.Dec. at 652,
597 N.E.2d at 626.
Firstly, the result obtained by the majority opinion, i.e., that the insurance company's subrogation action is not maintainable,
does not require that we reach the issue of
whether the tenant was a co-insured under
the landlord's policy. In Cerny-Pickas &
Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co. (1955), 7 I11.2d 393,
131 N.E.2d 100, this court held that a landlord's insurer's subrogation action was not
maintainable against a tenant, without additionally concluding that the tenant was a
co-insured under the landlord's insurance
policy. Cerny-Pickas determined that
such an action was not maintainable based
simply on an examination of the parties'
lease, which indicated that the tenant was
to be exonerated from liability for fire loss,
and certain "better reasoned decisions,"
which supported that result. {Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131 N.E.2d 100.) These
"better reasoned decisions" did not express
the view that tenants gain the status of coinsureds by the payment of rent, but simply noted that tenants, thereby, bear the
cost of insurance with their landlords.
(See Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d at 398, 131
N.E.2d 100.) In the instant case, as in
Cerny-Pickas, the majority need only have
looked to the parties' intent, as expressed
by their lease, as well as basic subrogation
principles, to conclude that the subrogation
action was not maintainable.
Secondly, but more importantly, the majority's holding on this point sweeps too
broadly, serving to eviscerate the common
law principle that a tenant is responsible
for damage to leased premises resulting
from his own negligence. (See 49 Am.

Jur.2d Landlord & Tenant §§ 934, 935
(1970); Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 1012, 1016 et
seq. (1950); Cerny-Pickas, 7 I11.2d 393, 131
N.E.2d 100; Fire Insurance Exchange v.
Geekie (1989), 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 128 111.
Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061.) Indeed, the
majority's holding, while stated to be limited to "the particular facts of this case"
(149 I11.2d at 323, 173 Ill.Dec, at 652, 597
N.E.2d at 626), serves to elevate the status
of every tenant to that of a co-insured
under his or her landlord's insurance policy, unless expressly indicated otherwise.
By logical extension, the tenant might then
also be considered a co-insured of the landlord with respect to personal property or
negligence liability on the premises.
It is recognized that a tenant may attain
the status of a co-insured where the insured landlord covenants to carry insurance for the benefit of the tenant. (See 16
Couch on Insurance § 61:137 (rev. 1983).)
Accordingly, our appellate court has approached the issue by looking at the express or implied terms of a lease, as well as
surrounding extrinsic evidence, to discern
the parties' agreement concerning the allocation of insurance burdens. (Compare
Continental Casualty Co. v. Polk Brothers, Inc. (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 395, 75 111.
Dec. 712, 457 N.E.2d 1271 (terms of lease
and extrinsic evidence revealed that parties
intended that landlord, rather than tenant,
obtain real property insurance, resulting in
nonviability of subrogation action); and
Reich v. Tharp (1987), 167 Ill.App.3d 496,
118 Ill.Dec. 248, 521 N.E.2d 530 (express
terms of sale agreentent provided that both
parties were to be named insureds on insurance policy, with the result that party omitted from policy deemed a co-insured); with
Fire Insurance Exchange, 179 Ill.App.3d
679, 128 Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061 (no
term in lease concerning obligation to insure premises; hence, tenant not a co-insured).) This approach is not to say, however, that in all instances where a landlord
has insurance and a tenant pays rent, the
tenant becomes a co-insured. The better
reasoned view, rather, requires that we
base our decision not on the mere existence
of insurance, but on the parties' agreement
as to the allocation of that burden.
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Notably, Anderson v. Peters (1986), 142
Ill.App.3d 182, 96 Ill.Dec. 489, 491 N.E.2d
768, a decision holding that a tenant is
considered a co-insured, despite the absence of any indication of the parties' intent, was expressly overruled by Fire Insurance Exchange, 179 Ill.App.3d 679, 128
Ill.Dec. 616, 534 N.E.2d 1061. The majority opinion returns us, sub silentio, to
Anderson.
Justice HEIPLE, dissenting:
This case involves an insurance company
which paid the insured landlord for fire loss
to rental property. The insurance company, by way of subrogation, now seeks to
recover from the tenant for his negligence
in causing the fire. The trial court, in
dismissing the insurance company's complaint, determined that the landlord and
tenant did not intend for the tenant to be
liable for fire damage, ruling that the tenant was a co-insured with the landlord.
The appellate court reversed and reinstated
the complaint The majority of this court
reverses the appellate court and affirms
the trial court.
This case presents the question of whether a tenant is absolved from liability for his
negligence in burning down the landlord's
premises. The majority holds that the tenant is absolved. The effect of this unfortunate decision is to make all tenants at any
time and at any place co-insureds with their
landlords. The only exception would be if
the parties had a clear agreement to the
contrary.
I have two objections to the majority
opinion. The first objection is that the
opinion makes factual findings which are,
simply put, not correct. My second objection is that the new rule of law which it
announces is bad public policy.
The majority opinion purports to find
that the lease instrument, when read as a
whole, contemplates that the tenant is a coinsured on the landlord's fire policy. A
reading of the lease discloses that this is
not the case. Whether read in its individual particulars or as a whole, the lease is
utterly silent in this regard. As the lease
is set out in full in the majority opinion, it

is not necessary to repeat it here. An
examination of the lease, however, discloses that nothing in it gives any indication that the parties intended to absolve the
tenant for his own negligent conduct or
that the tenant was regarded as a co-insured with the landlord. The only exculpatory language of any kind is in favor of the
landlord which provides in paragraph (E)
that the tenant assumes the risk for his
own personal property and that the landlord is not responsible for fire, wind or
water damage.
In arriving at its finding, the majority
points out that "neither the landlord nor
the tenant was a sophisticated real estate
mogul." (149 I11.2d at 321, 173 Ill.Dec. at
651, 597 N.E.2d at 625.) One may reasonably ask, If the parties had been sophisticated real estate moguls, would the result
in this case be different? Would it matter
if one were a greater mogul and the other
a lesser mogul? Is this a useful concept?
The majority concludes, "Under the particular facts of this case, the tenant, by
payment of rent, had contributed to the
payment of the insurance premium, thereby gaining the status of co-insured under
the insurance policy." Sad to say, there
are no facts in this case, either particular
or general, that would cause one to conclude that the tenant contributed to the
payment of the insurance premium or expected to be treated as a co-insured. That
assumption is as gratuitous as saying that
the payment of rent included maid service
and clean linens.
It is also worth noting that fire insurance
is, generically speaking, casualty insurance. Since the landlord owris the building,
he is the person at risk if the building
burns down from whatever cause, be it
lightning, faulty wiring, a bad furnace, or
the negligent conduct of any person. Conceptually, liability insurance is different
than casualty insurance. Liability insurance covers a person for his own negligent
conduct. Regarding liability, the lease in
this case clearly exculpated the landlord for
liability for damage caused to the tenant's
personal property. No similar language
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exculpated the tenant for negligently damaging the landlord's premises.
The fire insurance contract contemplated
that the insurance company, by way of
subrogation, could recover the loss paid
from any responsible party other than the
insured. In other words, the insurance
company in that regard would occupy the
same position as the insured himself.
There is nothing in law to require an insured to look either first or only to his
insurance carrier for recovery of loss
caused by another's negligence. The landlord, in this case, could have sued the tenant directly. There is also nothing in law
to require a landlord to carry fire insurance
at all. How can it be said that a tenant is
deemed to be a co-insured in a lease when
the lease does not even mention or contemplate insurance? Suppose that the landlord
in this case had not taken out an insurance
policy. Would the majority say he was
debarred from suing his tenant for negligently burning down the premises? That
is to say, would the loss be shifted away
from the negligent tenant and onto the
guiltless landlord?
Other jurisdictions have also addressed
the issue of when a tenant will be relieved
from liability for negligently causing a fire
in leased premises. The decisions from
various jurisdictions can be divided into
three categories: (1) absent an express
agreement to the contrary the tenant is
treated as a co-insured of the landlord and
is not liable for negligently causing a fire;
(2) absent an express agreement to the
contrary the tenant is liable for negligently
causing a fire; and (3) an express agreement is not required and the determination
of whether to hold the tenant liable for
negligently causing a fire must be ascertained from the lease as a whole.
The lead case which determined that a
tenant should be treated as a co-insured,
absent an express agreement to the contrary,
is
Sutton
v.
Jondahl
(Okla.App.1975), 532 P.2d 478. The reasons expressed for reaching this conclusion
were that: (1) an insurance policy protects
all property interest and both the tenant
and landlord have insurable interests in the

premises; (2) in reality the tenant pays for
part of the insurance premium through the
payment of rent; (3) the reasonable expectations of tenants is for the landlord to
provide fire insurance which will cover
them; and (4) equity calls for placing the
risk of fire loss" upon the insurer which has
collected premiums for the risk, rather
than upon the tenant, which is a party in
privity with the landlord. Sutton, 532 P.2d
at 482.
Several jurisdictions have followed Sutton. Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska Communications, Inc. (Alaska 1981),
623 P.2d 1216; Safeco Insurance Co. v.
Weisgerber (1989), 115 Idaho 428, 767 P.2d
271; Reeder v. Reeder (1984), 217 Neb. 120,
348 N.W.2d 832; Safeco Insurance Co. v.
Capri (1985), 101 Nev. 429, 705 P.2d 659;
Monterey Corp. v. Hart (1976), 216 Va.
843, 224 S.E.2d 142; Liberty Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Auto Spring Supply Co.
(1976), 59 Cal.App.3d 860, 131 Cal.Rptr.
211; New Hampshire Insurance Group v.
Labombard (1986), 155 Mich.App. 369, 399
N.W.2d 527; Fashion Place Investment,
Ltd. v. Salt Lake County/Salt Lake
County Mental Health (Utah App.1989),
776 P.2d 941; Cascade Trailer Court v.
Beeson (1988), 50 Wash.App. 678, 749 P.2d
761.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in Britton v. Wooten (Ky.1991), 817 S.W.2d 443,
recently addressed whether a tenant will be
held liable for negligently causing a fire.
In Britton, the court held that in order for
a tenant to be exonerated from liability for
negligently causing.a fire, the lease must
contain a clear and'unequivocal expression
stating such intent. In reaching this conclusion the Britton court noted that public
policy disapproves of exculpatory agreements in derogation of tort liability and
such an agreement should be found only if
it is explicit. Similar conclusions were also
reached in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling
(1957), 248 Iowa 582, 81 N.W.2d 462;
Winkler v. Appalachian Amusement Co.
(1953), 238 N.C. 589, 79 S.E.2d 185; Zoppi
v. Traurig (1990), 251 NJ.Super. 283, 598
A.2d 19; and Galante v. Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. (1958), 6 A.D.2d 142, 176 N.Y.S.2d
87. But cf Fireman's Insurance Co. v.
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Wheeler (1991), 165 A.D.2d
N.Y.S.2d 692.
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Falling between these two views are the
jurisdictions which do not require an express agreement to be in the lease. These
jurisdictions determine whether or not a
tenant is liable for his own negligence in
causing a fire based upon the intent of the
parties as evidenced from a reading of the
lease as a whole. If the intent of the
parties is unable to be ascertained, the
common law rule placing liability upon the
tenant for his negligent conduct is enforced. This court, prior to today's decision, clearly fell within this classification.
(Cerny-Pickas & Co. v. C.R. Jahn Co.
(1955), 7 I11.2d 393, 131 N.E.2d 100.) Other
jurisdictions which have endorsed this view
include Neubauer v. Hostetter (Iowa 1992),
485 N.W.2d 87; Acquisto v. Hahn Enterprises, Inc. (1980), 95 N.M. 193, 619 P.2d
1237; Page v. Scott (1978), 263 Ark. 684,
567 S.W.2d 101; and Rock Springs Realty,
Inc. v. Waid (Mo.1965), 392 S.W.2d 270.
In general, I believe that the public is
better served if negligent actors are held
responsible for the damage or injury they
cause. While I would agree that parties to
a lease may agree to exculpate a tenant for
negligent conduct which damages the
premises and that a lease may be drawn so
as to regard the tenant as a co-insured, I
cannot agree that the lease in this case
contemplated any such thing. Further, I
cannot agree that the mere payment of
rent in the absence of other language
should operate to exculpate a tenant who
negligently causes damage to the premises.
For the reasons given, I respectfully dissent.

